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Abstract
Having incorporated the characteristics of Chinese politics, this article puts forward
an exploratory analytic framework for understanding protest success and points out
how political opportunities and protest frames can explain protest success. Political
opportunities not only include direct intervention by the central government but
also support from state-sponsored media and favourable policies and laws. This
article uses the method of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to
compare 40 socially influential cases of anti-demolition protests in China. The results
show that the co-presence of central government intervention and supportive
reports from central state-sponsored media—which this study calls “multi-channelled
forceful intervention”—is a sufficient condition for protest success. Further, “multi-
channelled forceful intervention” depends on a favourable institutional environment
and protestors’ strategic use of multiple frames. This article not only enriches the
studies on protest results but also expands on the theory of political opportunity
structures and the study of protest frames.
Keywords: Frame, Political Opportunity, Multi-channelled forceful intervention,
Protest Success, Demolition
Research question
In recent years, research on protest has garnered increasing academic attention. Rele-
vant studies include environmental and “Not-In-My-Back-Yard” protests (Sun and
Zhao 2007), peasants’ protests (O’Brien and Li 2006; Ying 2007), workers’ protests
(Cheng 2012; Tong 2006), homeowners’ protests (Chen 2010; Zhang 2005), and anti-
demolition protests (Lü 2012). These studies have drawn on the insights of social
movement theories to study the organization, mobilization, and strategy of various
protests from the perspectives of resource mobilization, political opportunities, and
framing strategies. Although these studies have enhanced our understanding of protest
organization and mobilization, they have neglected the study of protest outcomes.
Having reviewed studies on the outcomes and consequences of Chinese mass inci-
dents, Tangbiao and Kong (2011) point out that Chinese scholarship of this topic is in-
adequate because it lacks clear research direction, analytic framework, and systematic
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empirical investigation. Some researchers have suggested that studies of popular pro-
tests should shift their focus from “using what weapon” to “why a weapon is effective”
(Huang 2011). In this light, the question of the present study is: in China, what are the
factors that shape the success of protests?1 Here success refers to achieving protestors’
intended goals.
By comparing cases of protests against residential demolition to acquire land, this art-
icle aims to provide a fairly systematic discussion about what factors can shape the suc-
cess of socially influential protests in China. As of now, anti-demolition protests have
become an archetypal phenomenon of China’s socio-economic transformation. Based
on the statistics of civil rights activism-related posts from the Tianya online community
in the “Annual Report on Social Mentality of China (2012–2013)”, forced demolition
incidents have occupied 20.1 % of China’s online civil rights activism discourse. Among
the letters the Chinese Ministry of Construction had received between January and Au-
gust of 2002, 28 % were related to housing demolition; among batches of petitions,
70 % were about demolition problems; and among group petitions, 83.7 % were related
to demolition (Zhao 2003). In China, residential demolition to acquire land is regarded
as one of the “troika” mass incidents.2 Given this background, investigating anti-
demolition protests can deepen our understanding of the forces that drive successful
protests in China.
We have collected, via media reports and the internet, 40 cases of anti-demolition
protests (2003–2012). Our comparative analysis of these cases attempts to go beyond
the characteristics of a particular protest and to reveal the conditions for the success of
socially influential protests. Though comparative case studies do not possess the kind
of generalizability manifested in statistical analyses, when compared to existing single
case studies and small-N analyses (e.g. Zhang 2005; Yu 2012; Cai 2010), this study can
deepen our understanding of the factors that shape protest success (Cress and Snow
2000). Specifically, this study attempts to make three contributions to existing studies
of protests: (1) it tests, albeit in a preliminary way, how well the existing literature on
social movements can explain protest success in China; (2) by incorporating character-
istics of China’s political system and the theoretical insights provided by the existing
studies of protests in China, it sums up the conditions for successful protests in an au-
thoritarian state, while also pointing out the importance of political opportunities and
protest frames; (3) it proposes and examines the influence of supportive reports from
central state-sponsored media and favourable institutions on protest success so as to
enhance our understanding of political opportunity structures in China.
Literature review and analytic perspective
Factors shaping protest success in Western and Chinese societies
Western literature has explained the outcomes of social movements from the perspec-
tives of organizational features, protest tactics, frames, public opinion, and political op-
portunities (Amenta & Caren 2004; Giugni 1998). Specifically, the theory of resource
mobilization emphasizes the importance of the organizational aspects of social move-
ments. Gamson (1990, in Giugni 1998) points out that social movement organizations
possessing the following features are likely to achieve success: single issue demands, the
use of selective incentives, the use of disruptive strategies, and being bureaucratized,
centralized, and unfactionalized. Research on the American Civil Rights Movement
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shows that organizational density and tactical diversity influence policy outcomes, as
measured by the annual federal budget for the Commission on Civil Rights (Olzak and
Ryo 2007). Piven and Cloward (1979) state that disruptive tactics help increase the
chance that the poor can launch a successful protest and that the so-called cadre orga-
nizations, rather than social movement organizations, play a major role in protests
launched by the poor (Cloward and Piven 1984).
Having reanalyzed Gamson’s data, Goldstone (1980) argues that political crisis is the
key to the success of social movements. Follow-up studies also show that political op-
portunity structures are key to explaining social movement outcomes (Kitschelt 1986;
McCammon et al. 2007; Rootes 2006). Yet, not all studies support the theory of polit-
ical opportunity structures (Olzak and Ryo 2007). In addition, Burstein (1999), from
the perspective of representative democracy, argues that public opinion is the founda-
tion for understanding the working mechanism of political opportunities. Although one
study has confirmed the importance of public opinion (Burstein and Linton 2002),
scholarship in general has not come to a definite conclusion (Amenta et al. 2005;
McCammon et al. 2007).
Framing strategies also influence protest outcomes. Cress and Snow’s (2000) study on
social movement organizations in the USA that focus on homelessness reveals the im-
portance of frames: among the six causal paths to achieved outcomes, three paths sim-
ultaneously contain diagnostic and prognostic frames, while two paths contain
prognostic frames. Similarly, frames are a crucial factor influencing the outcome of
women’s suffrage movement (McCammon 2001). Recent studies have developed the
concept of discursive opportunity structures to explain the effects of frames: as for the
US women jury movement, frames aligned with dominant legal discourses are more ef-
fective than others (McCammon et al. 2007).
Researchers have gradually come to understand the complex relationship between a
protest and its outcomes (Cress and Snow 2000; Giugni 2007). The political mediation
model contends that political environment is a mediating variable between protests and
policy outcomes. If long-term structural political conditions are favourable, social move-
ments per se can influence public policy; if short-term political opportunity structures are
relatively favourable, low levels of movement mobilization can influence public policy; if
short-term political opportunity structures are unfavourable, social movements must
adopt assertive actions to influence public policy (Amenta et al. 2005).
The question of what factors shape protest outcomes has slowly gained attention
from Chinese researchers. Studies on property owner protests show that key factors in
rights-defending activism include the following: leadership from prominent rights activ-
ists, establishment of homeowners’ committees, effective mobilization, well-chosen
strategies, homeowners’ rich social network resources, local government support,
highlighting the legality of rights and interests, and the relatively weak power of real es-
tate developers (Zhang 2005). Analysis of environmental protests shows that neither
state nor society is monolithic; instead, the results of protest actions are determined by
the configuration of contender alliances among different government departments, dif-
ferent levels of governments, mass media, and civil societies and their interactions with
opposing alliances (Sun and Zhao 2007). Yu (2012) points out that the relationship be-
tween protesters and authorities is key to the success of protests; meanwhile, she
stresses the importance of media reports and political opportunities. Cai (2010)
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analyses the success and failure of protests from a cost-benefit perspective, pointing
out that the cost of governments meeting protesters’ demands, protesters’ issue-linking
strategies, social ties between protesters and high level authorities, the forcefulness of
protests, and the absence of violence are crucial factors shaping protest outcomes.
Overall, existing studies show that, due to the absence of movement organizations, ac-
tivists and social ties play a vital role in China’s popular protests, while appropriate
strategies and political opportunities help protestors achieve success.
Analytic perspective
Although existing studies have enhanced our understanding of protest success, they
have some limitations. To begin, political opportunities are derived not only from
structural changes but also from the signals that political systems emit (Meyer and
Minkoff 2004). Studies of protests in China mostly emphasize the importance of
higher-level government interventions (Cai 2010). This suggests that it is necessary to
broaden the conception of political opportunity structures by contextually analysing
and incorporating the characteristics of China’s political system.
To understand protest success, one must consider the role of the state: no citizen is
immune from the influence of the state given its penetration into every corner of the
society; its monopoly over most resources, and that their redistribution deeply influ-
ences the structures of interests of all social classes; and that political power ultimately
determines the status and structural position of each and every social group, and,
through legislation, may co-opt or reject certain groups (Xie 2010, p. 4). In this way,
not only are there large differences between different actors in terms of resources and
influences but also the most powerful actors often reside within the political system.
This is particularly evident in the politics of residential demolition and land acquisition.
In 1997, the Chinese State Council announced “Notice on the Further Deepening Re-
form of Housing System and the Acceleration of Housing Construction”, which clearly
positioned real estate as one of the nation’s pillar industries; from this point onwards,
land development has become a major driving force in provincial economic develop-
ment (Li and Fan 2013). Since the tax-sharing reform of 1994, land development and
transfer have not only become a means for the local governments to consolidate their
own power but have also become major sources of local finance (Hsing 2010; Zhou
2007). This provides the local governments with a strong motive to participate in activ-
ities of residential demolition and land acquisition. As land becomes increasingly valu-
able, the desire for residents affected by demolition to protect their own interests
increases, which intensifies conflicts between demolition contractors and those affected
by demolition. In a given demolition dispute, opponents of anti-demolition protesters
often have the advantage in terms of resources, organization, and policy; without exter-
nal support, protestors rarely achieve their desired outcomes. Furthermore, because
anti-demolition protests are closely related to people’ basic livelihoods, any mishandling
of these cases may incur vast social influences and consequences; thus, the state tends
to offer a balance in the game of clashing social forces to maintain social stability. The
state’s leading role means that the central government can become a balancing power
in interest disputes among various social groups, and intervention from the central
government is crucial to protest success.
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Within a multi-layered and flexible political structure (Cai 2008), the central govern-
ment conditionally grants the local governments the autonomy to respond to protests
so that the majority of protests are contained at the local level; at the same time, the
central government retains the power to restrain the local governments so that the cen-
tral government selectively provides expressive outlets for social demands while main-
taining state legitimacy and social stability. This article argues that the central
government, the embodiment of the state, can shape protest results in at least three
ways.
First, the central government can directly intervene in a protest and this determines
the success or failure of that protest. Existing literature has provided ample discussion
on this scenario (Cai 2010), and thus, we will not discuss it in detail.
Secondly, central state-sponsored media’s supportive reports on protests often have
an influence on the success of protests, which we see as a political opportunity that dif-
fers from direct intervention by the central government. The central government’s dir-
ect intervention is mostly bureaucratic and organizational. However, central state-
sponsored media can be regarded as both “public institutions” and “market enmities”
(Li 2003) and whose attitudes in news reports are to a certain degree independent of
the central government. Based on our observations, the cases reported by central state-
sponsored media were not always the ones that the central government chose to inter-
vene in; on the other hand, just because the central government chooses to intervene
in some cases does not mean that state-sponsored media will choose to report on them.
This article argues that state-sponsored media, especially central-level media’s support-
ive coverage of protests, can reflect state authorities’ attitudes towards these pro-
tests—this is a public signal from state authorities. Although such signals are not a
direct indication of a willingness to intervene, they help protestors discover political
opportunities, thereby strengthening protestors’ confidence and improving their ability
to mobilize further support from the public. This dynamic may affect the local govern-
ments’ responding strategies and central government’s intervention paths, which even-
tually help protests achieve success. Noticeably, supportive reports from central-level
state-sponsored media are more likely to reflect the relationship between actors within
the political system and protesters than the relationship between the public and pro-
testers. Therefore, supportive reports should be understood as political opportunities
rather than social influences.
Thirdly, intervention by the central government is affected by changes in laws and
regulations. Reviewing the course of change in the Chinese demolition system, “Urban
Housing Units Demolition Management Regulations” of 2001 stipulates that “when
demolishing houses meets with residents’ protest, demolition must be done forcefully”;
this stipulation has essentially strengthened the demolition policy of the local govern-
ments and land developers. Though various demolition policies have been constantly
readjusted in the previous decade, the institutional environment for the aforementioned
“double standard” continues to exist, and different actors (e.g. protesters and local gov-
ernments) cite different legal rules to defend themselves. The constitutional amend-
ment of 2004 and the Property Law of 2007 both make clear that Chinese citizens have
rights to their private properties, and this marks an obvious improvement to the insti-
tutional environment for anti-demolition protests. Although property law is a higher-
ranking law than is “Urban Housing Units Demolition Management Regulations”, the
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state had not systematically unified the laws and regulations pertinent to demolition
until 2011. After the promulgation of “Regulations on the Expropriation and Compen-
sation of Houses on State-owned Land” of 2011, the institutional environment regard-
ing demolition significantly improved.
Given these changes in policies, regulations, and laws, the relationship between the
institutional environment and popular protests deserves scholarly analysis. This article
argues that not only can the institutional environment shape the manner of protest, it
also shapes protest outcomes. Given that the legitimacy of protest is often a challenging
issue (Ying 2007), favourable policies and laws strengthen a claim’s legitimacy and thus
decrease the possibility that the local governments will take suppressive measures. If
earlier protests lead to readjustments in laws and regulations (Cai 2010), such readjust-
ments would signal that the central government wants the local governments to handle
social conflicts appropriately; in this case, changes in laws and regulations represent the
central government’s attitudes towards protesters and can be seen as “signals” of polit-
ical opportunities. In addition, protest-supported demolition litigation brings pressure
to the courts, which in turn pushes the courts to develop coping strategies to constrain
the housing demolition authorities (He 2014). Because protesters in socially influential
protests will try their utmost to utilize all possible opportunities and resources, signifi-
cant changes in the institutional environment can provide new forms of resources, indi-
cating the expansion of political opportunities.
Because the law can be understood and interpreted in multiple ways, its role in social
contestation has been a controversial issue (McCann 2004). In the field of housing
demolition, local governments tend to cite “Urban Housing Units Demolition Manage-
ment Regulations” to support forced demolition, whereas anti-demolition protestors
cite new laws and regulations that prohibit forced demolition. Readjustments in laws
and regulations not only change the legal resources available to both local governments
and anti-demolition protestors but also prompt different parties to have divergent in-
terpretations about the applicability of laws and regulations. Within an “unstable” insti-
tutional environment, intervention from the central government once again becomes a
key factor influencing protest results.
In addition to the aforementioned flexible political structure, the central govern-
ment’s intervention in anti-demolition protests depends on the frames employed by
protestors. The justification for financial compensation has been the core issue in many
demolition and relocation disputes; given that every demolition operation involves dif-
ferent levels of compensation, ranging from a few hundreds of thousands yuan to a few
millions yuan to a few tens of millions yuan, all of which are large numbers. In a sense,
during the process of demolition and relocation there has been a conflict of interest be-
tween local governments and civilians—which can be regarded as important to interest
redistribution. When handled inappropriately, demolition can cause massive societal
impacts, even affecting social stability and state legitimacy. Since many anti-demolition
protests focus on economic demands rather than ideological appeals, interventions by
the central government bear little political risk. The fact that anti-demolition protests
exert enormous impacts on Chinese society in turn give the central government incen-
tives to intervene. Under such circumstances, when anti-demolition protestors use
multiple frames to demonstrate the legitimacy of their actions and claims, and the
employed frames are congruent or compatible with the central government’s ideology,
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protestors are more likely to gain attention and successfully convince the central gov-
ernment to intervene.
Although protest frames have strong explanatory power regarding the success of social
movements in the West (Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon et al. 2007; McCammon
2001), Chinese academia has not yet systematically examined whether frames can influ-
ence protest success—the few studies that do focus on protest frames have mainly con-
centrated on the relationship between frames and mobilization (Cheng 2012; Tong 2006;
Xia 2014). Nevertheless, the existing literature provides valuable insights about the rela-
tionship between frames and protest success. Because protesters usually have explicit
interest-based claims, the primary task of framing is to justify and legitimize these claims.
For instance, worker protesters tend to use the discourse of socialist cultural traditions
(Tong 2006), political appeals, and state policies and regulations (Cheng 2012) to defend
their demands. Moreover, the visibility, legitimacy, and public resonance of protests to a
large degree depend on the process of framing and discursive opportunity structures
(McCammon et al. 2007). Based on the above discussion, we argue that frames may in-
crease the chance of intervention from the central government by generating resonance
between the state and protest demands, and this is more likely to occur when frames are
derived from fundamental socio-political cultures. Consequently, frame resonance may
open up new political opportunities for protesters.
As for anti-demolition protests, before a dispute enters the public view, protestors often
use “weapons of the weak” to protest; after a dispute enters the public view and has gained
attention from the media, however, the core position changes to highlight and criticize
demolition policies (Lü 2012). Because China’s urban land development is facilitated by rela-
tively comprehensive regulatory changes (Weinstein and Ren 2009), “rule violation” has be-
come a forceful and resonant frame. Furthermore, there has been a fracture between
constitution- and tradition-based property systems; specifically, the re-demarcation of prop-
erties that were built before the establishment of the modern property system, in the mem-
ories and historical records of property holders, was “exploitive” in nature, causing both
cognitive and interest conflicts. Similarly, before the housing reform, housing property
rights experienced major changes, resulting in some ownership claims being disputed (Zhou
and Logan 1996). The resentment caused by the aforementioned historical legacies has
prompted protestors to use a historical perspective to legitimize their demands through the
discourses of collectivism and socialism (Hsing 2010: Shin 2013). Because China’s rural
lands are owned collectively, peasants have come to think of the state as “parents”. This per-
ception, together with the weighing of interests, livelihoods and village customs, as well as
the “reason things out” approach common to village societies, determine peasants’ choices
as they protest against land acquisition (Zhu 2011). Based on the literature and our own ob-
servations of anti-demolition protests, we suggest that “rule violation”, “the weak identity”,
“socialism”, and “collectivism” are common frames deployed by anti-demolition protestors.
Based on the above discussion, this article contends that protest frames can influence
protest success by affecting the probability of “state” intervention, whereas the political
influence of protest frames to a large extent depends on the legal-political institution.
Since existing research has rarely explained Chinese anti-demolition protests from the
perspective of frames, this article does not directly put forward specific propositions in
regard to the effects of frames; instead, we aim to reveal associational patterns between
frames and protest success through cross-case comparison.
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Research method
Data source and methods of data collection
The study consists of 40 anti-demolition protests that happened between 2003 and
2012. Anti-demolition protests were chosen as a study subject for the following rea-
sons: anti-demolition contestation includes not only protests by village residents but
also by urban residents; protesters come from multiple social classes, including but not
limited to peasants, workers, marginal urbanites, and new urban middle class; and this
diversity has led to a range of protest tactics.
We chose 2003 as the starting point for three reasons: firstly, 2003 is regarded
as the year when new forms of protest began to emerge in the 21st century (Zhao
2012, p. 4); secondly, a landmark demolition event in China happened in 2003
(Zhu 2009); thirdly, in these 10 years, there had been a series of readjustments in
laws and regulations in relation to demolition, and these changes provide an op-
portunity to investigate the relationship between institutional environment and pro-
test success.
We identified the cases through media and internet reports, a method that has been
widely used in studies of social movements in Western societies (Earl et al. 2004) and
studies of protests in China (Cai 2010). Although case selection through media reports
might lead to bias, it does not mean that we should completely abandon this method. In-
stead, we must contextually assess whether this method is better than others (Earl et al.
2004, p. 69). Considering that existing studies are primarily single case studies, cross-case
comparison helps more systematically assess the explanatory conditions for protest suc-
cess. In addition, the selection bias associated with this method has been empirically in-
vestigated in a previous study (McCarthy et al. 2008), which helps clarify potential bias
and the generalizability of present findings. In fact, we do not attempt to reveal
the conditions for all successful protests but merely aim to explain the success of
socially influential protests. Moreover, consistent with the approach of qualitative
comparison analysis (Rihoux and Lobe 2009), our case selection method helps im-
prove the comparability of cases. Last but not least, as Chinese media has under-
gone marketization (Li and Liu 2009), the space for reporting controversial events
has expanded (Stockmann 2010). Our interviews also show that Chinese media can
report controversies through two channels: first, there is ample space for news re-
ports before the authorities explicitly prohibit reporting protests; second, even if
bans do exist in a province, the news agency can publish reports through affiliated
agencies or partners in other provinces. Based on the above discussion, we argue
that our data collection method is reasonable.
Our data collection procedure is as follows: (1) we used the keyword “demolition” to
conduct a full-text search on “Chinese Core Newspapers Full-Text Data Base” from
China National Knowledge Infrastructure (www.cnki.net) and retrieved 13,024 news re-
ports; (2) we read through all the reports and filtered out cases which had been re-
ported by at least two media outlets to be included in our dataset; (3) considering that
a few protests were primarily exposed through the internet and had significant impacts
on Chinese society but failed to receive mainstream media coverage, we synthesized in-
formation about these cases via mainstream web portals such as Sina.com.cn to supple-
ment our database. All selected cases have the following features: the selected protests
were caused by land acquisition for a public project or commercial development and
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the core demand was demolition compensation; the targets of the protests were gov-
ernments or developers; there were antagonistic relations between anti-demolition pro-
testors and their opponents because solving the disputes would alter both sides’
interests; and every selected protest involved more than two people. The coding of our
cases was based on reading through relevant media reports and reviewing the second-
hand literature and documents such as documented interview records, court pleadings
(and rulings), banner slogans, pictures, open letters, texts from blogs/microblogs, and
academic articles. Depending on information availability, the number of available docu-
ments for most cases ranged from ten to dozens, and the number for a few cases even
reached hundreds. Our data collection process lasted more than 6 months, during
which time we triangulated the information. Therefore, our data is both credible and
valid.
The analytic technique: fuzzy-set qualitative comparison
Qualitative comparison analysis (QCA) is suitable for systematically comparing small to
medium numbers of cases. This method uses a set-theoretic approach to establish the ne-
cessary and sufficient relationship between explanatory conditions and outcome variables.
In the analysis of sufficient conditions, QCA can discover multiple conjectural causes of a
particular result, which means that the occurrence of the result can be explained by differ-
ent causes, while each cause is comprised of multiple explanatory conditions. In qualita-
tive comparative analysis, capital letters indicate the presence of conditions, lowercase
letters indicate the absence of conditions, operator “*” means co-presence, and operator
“+” links two alternative causal paths. For instance, “A * b + B * c = Y” means that two
paths lead to the presence of Y; the first path A * b means the presence of A and the ab-
sence of b, whereas the second path B * c means the presence of B and the absence of c.
In order to overcome the limitations of crisp-set qualitative comparison analysis, which
requires that all variables be dichotomous, Ragin (2008) puts forward a fuzzy-set qualita-
tive comparison analysis (fsQCA). This approach uses fuzzy-set scores to present the de-
gree of membership in explanatory conditions and results. Because a fuzzy-set score can
be any number between 0 and 1, it can avoid information loss in the process of data trans-
formation and more accurately reflect the situations of the chosen cases. This approach
has been utilized in studies of social movements (Amenta et al. 2005).
To proceed with fsQCA analysis, researchers must designate a coding scheme with quali-
tative anchors to assign fuzzy-set scores to cases and then evaluate the necessary or suffi-
cient relations between explanatory conditions and results based on a consistency index.
Consistency can be used to evaluate whether a particular condition or the combinations of
conditions can be regarded as a sufficient or necessary condition of the result. If an explana-
tory condition (or combination of conditions) X is a sufficient condition of result Y, then the
fuzzy-set score of X is consistently lower than or equal to the fuzzy-set score of Y; and the
corresponding consistency is measured as follows:
Consistency Xi≤Y ið Þ ¼
X
min Xi ; Y ið Þ½ =
X
Xi
When the index is greater than 0.8, it roughly indicates that more than 80 % of the
cases are consistent and X is a sufficient condition of Y. When consistency is satisfied,
researchers can move on to calculate the coverage index:
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Consistency Xi≤Y ið Þ ¼
X
min Xi ; Y ið Þ½ =
X
Y i
This index depicts the explanatory power of X for result Y.3 The greater the coverage,
the greater the empirical explanatory power of X for Y. Similarly, we can calculate
Consistency (Yi ≤ Xi) to evaluate whether X can be regarded as a necessary condition of
Y. If the index is greater than 0.9, we regard X as a necessary condition.
When doing exploratory analysis, one could use the above indexes to assess the ne-
cessity and sufficiency of one explanatory condition. However, when analysing multiple
conjectural causes, one needs to build truth tables based on consistency, which present
the connections between the combinations of explanatory conditions and the outcome,
and then use a Boolean minimization algorithm to simplify the truth tables so as to re-
veal the causal paths leading to the result (Ragin 2008).
In QCA, the numbers of combinations of explanatory conditions increase exponen-
tially with the numbers of selected conditions, resulting in complicated causal paths
that are difficult to interpret. The existing methodological literature recommends that
one should clarify the causal mechanisms through which different conditions interact
with each other to influence the outcome, and then choose the relevant conditions for
QCA analysis (Amenta and Poulsen 1994). Given that existing studies on protests
mainly focus on the effects of specific factors on protest results (the few exceptions are
Amenta et al. 2005; Cress and Snow 2000), this article will first examine the explana-
tory conditions of each theory, and then proceed to evaluate the combinational effects
of conditions of different theories.
Measures
Because the comparative method itself cannot provide a guideline for selecting explanatory
conditions, researchers must choose these conditions based on existing theories (Caramani
2009, pp. 52–55). According to the existing literature, we focus on explanatory conditions
such as political opportunities, resource mobilization, protest tactics, and protest frames. Al-
though a protest’s levels of social influence might shape protest success, we have chosen not
to include it as an explanatory condition for two reasons. First, our case selection method
implies that the levels of their social influence are similar, and they can be regarded as a
constant. Second, a protest’s levels of social influence to a large extent depend on media re-
ports and the involvement of opinion leaders. Yet, most of the cases selected in this study
have been reported by mainstream media, and new media reports (e.g. social media, inter-
net) and the involvement of opinion leaders have been included as explanatory conditions
to assess the theory of resource mobilization.
We adopted a six-value coding scheme.4 In order to reduce the subjectivity of the
fuzzy-set score assignment, this study follows the credibility principle of qualitative text
analysis (Kuckartz 2014). Three authors discussed the rules of score assignment in de-
tail, based on which we coded all cases, and further discussed discrepancies so as to
achieve a consensus. It should be noted that some variables only had limited variance,
and the actual fuzzy-set scores might not cover all six values.
In our study, the explained variable of protest success indicates the degree of achieve-
ment of protest demands, where “1” represents protest demands being fully met, “0.6”
represents protest demands being met with substantial costs such as a “tragic victory”,
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and “0” indicates failure. Descriptive analysis shows that 35 % of cases achieved success,
22.5 % were tragic victories, and 42.5 % failed.
Political opportunities are measured with three variables, namely central government
intervention (CGOV), supportive reports from central state-sponsored media outlets (CME-
DIA), and favourable institutional framework (OBOPP5). As for central government inter-
vention, the fuzzy-set score 1 represents that the central government intervenes in protest
events by making public announcements or deploying a state council appointed task force,
issuing new policies and regulations, explicitly supporting anti-demolition protesters or
punishing local governments; 0.6 represents the central government’s direct intervention in
the events, but upholding a neutral stance; and 0 represents non-involvement. Among our
cases, 32.5 % have a fuzzy-set score of 1, 5 % have a fuzzy-set score of 0.6, and 62.5 % have
a fuzzy-set score of 0.
The fuzzy-set score assignment of supportive reports from central state-sponsored media
has not only considered the levels of social influence of media outlets and their stances but
also guaranteed that their reports appeared after protests had occurred and before protests
had been settled. Here, 1 represents supportive reports from central state-sponsored media
such as Xinhua News Agency Head Office, People’s Daily, CCTV, or Xinhua Daily Tele-
graph; 0.8 represents supportive reports from China Youth Daily, Procuratorate Daily, or
Legal Daily; given that state-sponsored media reports can heighten the influence of protests
and have a positive effect on conflict resolution, we used 0.6 to represent impartial reports
from the above media outlets; and 0 represents the absence of reports from any of the above
state-sponsored media outlets.
The variable favourable institutional framework represents the degree to which laws and
regulations are conducive to protestors’ claim-making. This variable is used to assess
whether the central government indirectly shapes protest success by amending laws and
regulations and thus measures the expansion of political opportunity (Tarrow 2011). For
this variable, 0 represents that the institutional framework is disadvantageous to protestors,
who face forced demolition without effective lawful weapons to self-defend (2001–2004);
0.4 represents that private properties were recognized in principle but without specific pro-
tective ordinances (that is, from the fourth amendment to the Constitution in 2004 until
the introduction of Property Law in 2007); 0.6 represents that the rights and interests of
anti-demolition protestors have to some extent been safeguarded because the 2007 amend-
ment to Urban Real Estate Administration Law has put forward the need to protect the
legal rights and interests of those being relocated due to residential demolition and guaran-
tees standard residential conditions after relocation (2007–2010); 0.8 represents a relatively
favourable institutional framework with the abolishment of “Urban Housing Units Manage-
ment Regulations”; 1 represents a favourable institutional framework (since January 2011)
with the introduction of “Regulations on the Expropriation and Compensation of Houses
on State-Owned Land”, which provides detailed ordinances regarding the standards for
compensation and the legal responsibilities of demolition contractors.
Measures of resource mobilization include mobilization networks (Yu 2012; Zhang 2005),
the support of opinion leaders, and the involvement of new media (Lü 2012). Mobilization
networks measure how many social ties were mobilized by protesters to advance their de-
mands. Here, 1 represents that protestors enjoyed great support from immediate family
members and protest allies, 0.4 represents that protesters gained support from few family
members, and 0 means that protesters fought without additional support. As for the
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support of opinion leaders, 1 represents the involvement of opinion leaders and 0 means
the absence of opinion leaders. As for the involvement of new media, 1 represents protests
being reported by more than three national websites, causing linked interactions nation-
wide; 0.4 represents protests being reported by one or two national websites; and 0 repre-
sents the absence of national reports. It should be noted that this variable measures new
media reports that were produced in tandem with the unfolding protests. Due to a lack of
data availability, we did not measure protest size. Yet, this limitation is offset by the follow-
ing elements: (1) mobilization networks can be seen as proxies for protest size and (2) the
positive relationship between media reports and protest size (McCarthy et al. 2008) implies
that the effect of the latter is partially controlled by the inclusion of the former.
Protest tactics include disruptive tactics, violence, and performance (Amenta and Caren
2004; Giugni 1998; Cai 2010; Huang 2011). Disruptive tactic refers to actions threatening
public order/safety. Here, value 1 represents the occurrence of serious injuries and casual-
ties; 0.8 represents using illegal home-made weaponry, which would jeopardize public order;
0.6 represents actions slightly upsetting public order; and 0 means actions with no disrup-
tion. Violence measures the violent nature of protest actions. In this variable, value 1 indi-
cates extreme measures such as self-immolation; 0.8 means violent behaviour without
casualties; 0.6 means the threat of violent acts; and 0 means the absence of violence. As for
the performative tactic, 1 indicates that protestors actively publicized protests through dra-
matic acts and performance; 0.6 indicates protests being publicized by third parties through
dramatic narratives or performance; and 0 indicates the absence of drama or performance.
Protest frames reflect protestors’ discursive strategies to put forward their demands. Be-
cause frames might be developed by protestors alone or through discursive interactions
between protestors, media, and the public, this study only measures whether a particular
frame is used in relation to protest demands. As long as a frame is deployed, its value is 1,
otherwise 0. Based on the examination of all selected cases, we have come up with four
frames, namely “frame of the weak” (WEAK), “socialist frame” (SOCIALISM), “collectivist
frame” (COLLECTIVISM), and “frame of rule violation” (RU_VIOLATION). WEAK em-
phasizes protestors’ status of being weak in conflicts (Dong 2008); it highlights the image
of a vulnerable group under powerful oppression. SOCIALISM derives from the relation-
ship between CCP and the mass; protestors borrow symbols and values of socialist ideol-
ogy with Chinese characteristics and bind together individual protests with the mission of
socialist justice to gain legitimacy from the “holy” state as well as to discredit local govern-
ments. COLLECTIVISM derives from the way protestors understand the relationship be-
tween personal and collective interests and that between private and public interests; not
only does COLLECTIVISM include using collectivist discourse to demonstrate the legit-
imacy of demands but it also includes protestors criticizing local governments for violat-
ing and twisting collectivist principles. RU_VIOLATION emphasizes specific laws and
regulations in the realm of demolition, for instance, whether demolition planners applied
to the court for forced demolition.
Analysis results
What factors can shape the success of protests?
This article first investigates the relationship between single explanatory conditions and
protest success. Our results show (see Table 1) that consistencies of central government
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intervention, supportive reports by central state-sponsored media, and favourable insti-
tutional framework as necessary conditions are all below 0.9; therefore, they, on their
own, cannot be regarded as necessary conditions of protest success. Consistencies of
central government intervention and supportive reports by central state-sponsored
media as sufficient conditions score 0.79 and 0.78, respectively, which are slightly lower
than the 0.8 standard score and can be regarded as nearly sufficient conditions. Cover-
age of central government intervention and supportive reports by central state-
sponsored media are 0.58 and 0.70, respectively. Comparison of these two values shows
that the latter has a greater explanatory power for protest success than the former. The
sufficient consistency of favourable institutional framework is 0.6, which suggests that
it cannot be regarded as a sufficient condition for protest success. In sum, political op-
portunities have significant effects on protest success, but political opportunities alone
cannot adequately explain the variation in protest success.
As for mobilization theory, mobilization networks and support from internet opinion
leaders are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for protest success. The inter-
linked reporting by new media can be regarded as a necessary condition for success of
socially influential protests. Almost all successful protests have been reported by new
media. Further analysis shows that new media reports are not a necessary condition for
the failure of protests, which means that new media reports are not a “trivial” necessary
condition. However, new media reports are not a sufficient condition for protest suc-
cess. As for protest tactics, be it disruptive, violent, or performative, none can be
regarded as a sufficient condition for protest success. Similarly, any single protest frame
alone cannot be regarded as a sufficient condition for protest success.
Next, we assessed the explanatory power of each theory by treating the correspond-
ing variables as a group of explanatory conditions. We constructed truth tables and
proceeded to simplify the truth tables through Boolean minimization (Table 2). The
analysis of the three variables of political opportunities reveals two causal paths to











0.58 – 0.79 0.577
State-sponsored media
support
0.70 – 0.78 0.701
Favourable institutional
framework
0.81 – 0.60 –
Mobilization networks 0.82 – 0.66 –
New media involvement 1.00 0.538 0.54 –
Opinion leaders’ involvement 0.28 – 0.49 –
Disruption strategy 0.15 – 0.41 –
Violence strategy 0.36 – 0.34 –
Performance strategy 0.82 – 0.60 –
WEAK 0.53 – 0.39 –
SOCIALISM 0.70 – 0.50 –
COLLECTIVISM 0.47 – 0.66 –
RU_VIOLATION 0.56 – 0.54 –
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protest success: (1) the co-presence of three conditions, which explains the majority of
our cases and (2) the co-presence of central government intervention and supportive
reports from central state-sponsored media. These two causal paths can be further sim-
plified to “central government intervention * supportive reports from central state-
sponsored media”. The sufficient consistency and coverage of this causal path are 0.87
and 0.57, respectively. The coverage indicates that among the successful protests, about
57 % of them can be explained by this path. This result shows that the theory of polit-
ical opportunity structures can to a certain degree explain the success of anti-
demolition protests.
The analysis of the three variables for resource mobilization shows that no combina-
tions can explain protest success. Similarly, no combinations of the three variables re-
lated to protest tactics can be seen as sufficient conditions for protest success.
Combinations of four protest frames can to some degree explain protest success.
fsQCA reveals three causal paths: (F1) “using SOCIALISM and COLLECTIVISM while
not using WEAK”, (F2) “using SOCIALISM and COLLECTIVISM while not using
RU_VIOLATION”, and (F3) “using WEAK and RU_VIOLATION while not using SO-
CIALISM and COLLECTIVISM”. Comparison of these paths shows that SOCIALISM
and COLLECTIVISM tend to appear together but not show up with either WEAK or
RU_VIOLATION at the same time. Comparison of the raw and unique coverages6 of
the three paths shows that path F1 has the largest explanatory power whereas path F3
has the smallest explanatory power. This indicates that SOCIALISM and COLLECTIV-
ISM play a significant role in anti-demolition protests. Although the three causal paths
involving protest frames satisfy the sufficiency criterion, they only explain approxi-
mately 36 % of the successful cases (raw coverage is 0.36). Comparison shows that the
explanatory power of frames is weaker than that of political opportunity structures
(raw overage is 0.57). One explanation might be that framing strategies influence pro-
test success indirectly through changing the probability of a central government re-
sponse to protests. This indirect working mechanism might have reduced the
explanatory power of protest frames.
In sum, resource mobilization and protest tactics cannot adequately explain protest
success; protest frames have a moderate explanatory power for protest success, while
political opportunities have fairly strong explanatory power. Although existing studies
have pointed out that political opportunities play a significant role in the success of
Table 2 Opportunities, resources, strategies, frames, and protest success: results of fsQCA






CGOV * CMEDIA 0.87 0.57 0.57
Resource
mobilization
IS – – –
Protest tactics IS – – –
Frames F1: weak * SOCIALISM * COLLECTIVISM 1 0.26 0.26
F2: SOCIALISM * COLLECTIVISM * ru_violation 1 0.16 0.05
F3: WEAK * socialism * collectivism *
RU_VIOLATION
1 0.05 0.05
[solution] 1 0.36 0.36
Note: IS represents being insufficient to explain protest success, in which case consistency has no meaning, shown as “–”
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protests in China (e.g. Cai 2010), they mainly emphasize the importance of direct inter-
vention from higher-level governments and have not differentiated modes of govern-
ment intervention nor elaborated how different modes of intervention shape protest
success. This article not only lends support to the importance of central government
intervention but also shows that the explanatory power of supportive reports from cen-
tral state-sponsored media is greater than that of the central government’s direct inter-
vention. In particular, the central intervention would have the most effective effect on
protest success when it occurs through multiple institutionalized channels and is pub-
licly endorsed by state-sponsored media. We call this “multi-channelled forceful
intervention”.
Assessment of the robustness of the causal paths to successful protests
Given that the results of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis is sensitive to the as-
signment of fuzzy-set scores (Skaaning 2011), it is necessary to test the robustness of
the analytical results.
Some may argue that a “tragic victory” should be regarded as failure because protestors
have paid a huge price and thus be coded as 0.4 instead of 0.6. We recoded “tragic victory”
as 0.4 and re-ran the above analysis, and the results were basically the same. In our single
factor analysis, except for “new media involvement”, no other factors on their own can be
regarded as a necessary condition for protest success; and no factors can be regarded as a
sufficient condition for protest success, with the sufficiency consistencies of “CGOV” and
“CMEDIA” dropping to 0.72 and 0.71. This shows that it is harder to explain protest suc-
cess when the standard of protest success is raised. We then reanalysed the explanatory
power of each theory for protest success. The results show that resource mobilization and
protest tactics cannot adequately explain success, whereas protest frames and political op-
portunities can to some extent explain success. As for protest frames, we found the same
causal paths as in the previous analysis, but the raw coverage became 0.397. However,
when raising the standard of protest success, the co-presence of “CGOV”, “CMEDIA”,
and “OBOPP” is required to achieve protest success. This causal path explains approxi-
mately 46.5 % of the successful cases, which is larger than that of protest frames.
We also investigated how the assignment of fuzzy-set scores of CGOV and CMEDIA
may influence the robustness of the findings. We recoded “central government inter-
vention with a neutral stance” to 0.7 and re-ran the analysis, and the result remained
basically the same. Similarly, we achieved the same conclusion even if we recoded the
values of 0.4 and 0.6 in CMEDIA as 0.3 and 0.7, respectively.
Political opportunities as a variable
Because the central government does not intervene in all protests, studies of protest
outcomes must answer the question of “under what circumstances will the central gov-
ernment intervene”. However, this question has not been adequately explored by exist-
ing studies (Cai 2010, p. 5). Cai (2010) points out that the central government’s
intervention to some degree depends on the forcefulness of the protest, which is deter-
mined by protestors’ resources and strategies. The present study further contends that
framing strategies have a significant influence on the occurrence of the central govern-
ment’s multi-channelled forceful intervention.
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This section uses fsQCA to investigate the effects of resource mobilization, protest
tactics, and protest frames on the occurrence of multi-channelled intervention. Our re-
sults (Table 3) show that neither the three variables in relation to resource mobilization
nor the three protest tactics can sufficiently explain the central government’s multi-
channelled intervention. However, different combinations of protest frames can ad-
equately explain the occurrence of the central government’s multi-channelled forceful
intervention. The result of fsQCA reveals three causal paths. Causal path F1 is “using
WEAK, SOCIALISM and COLLECTIVISM while not using RU_VIOLATION”, which
explains about 8 % of the cases. Causal path F2 is “not using WEAK but using COL-
LECTIVISM and RU_VIOLATION”, which explains about 30 % of the cases. These
two paths together explain about 38 % of the cases involving the central government’s
multi-channelled intervention. This result confirms, in a preliminary way, our argu-
ment that protest frames are a key to understanding government intervention.
Previously, we argued that the numerous readjustments in laws and regulations dur-
ing the past 10 years have expanded political opportunities for anti-demolition pro-
testers. And descriptive analysis shows that about 60.1 % of the successful protests
occurred within a favourable institutional framework. An institutional framework not
only facilitates/constrains protestors’ mobilization efforts and choice of protest tactics
and frames but it also influences the chance of central government’s responding strat-
egies; therefore, we included “favourable institutional framework” (OBOPP) and four
protest frames as explanatory conditions and re-ran the analysis. The result reveals four
causal paths, including (IF1) “presence of OBOPP, using SOCIALISM and COLLECT-
IVISM, not using RU_VIOLATION”, (IF2) “presence of OBOPP, using SOCIALISM
and RU_VIOLATION, but not using WEAK”, (IF3) “presence of OBOPP, using SO-
CIALISM and RU_VIOLATION, but not using WEAK”, and (IF4) “using COLLECTIV-
ISM, SOCIALISM and RU_VIOLATION”. The overall coverage of this set of causal
paths is 0.507, which indicates that more than half of the multi-channelled forceful
intervention cases can be explained by frames and institutional framework. Further
Table 3 The conditions for “multi-channelled forceful intervention”




Resource mobilization IS – – –
Protest tactics IS – – –
Frames F1: WEAK * SOCIALISM * COLLECTIVISM
*ru_violation
1 0.08 0.08
F2: weak * SOCIALISM * RU_VIOLATION 0.95 0.30 0.30
[solution] 0.96 0.38 0.38
Institutional environment
* frames
IF1: OBOPP * SOCIALISM * COLLECTIVISM *
ru_violation
1 0.16 0.16
IF2: OBOPP * weak * SOCIALISM *
RU_VIOLATION
0.93 0.21 0.08
IF3: OBOPP * weak * COLLECTIVISM *
RU_VIOLATION
1 0.18 0.05
IF4: weak * SOCIALISM * COLLECTIVISM *
RU_VIOLATION
0.93 0.22 0.10
[solution] 0.94 0.51 0.51
Note: IS represents being unable to form sufficient conditions such that consistency has no meaning, shown as “–”
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examination shows that OBOPP is an ingredient of three paths, and the unique cover-
age of the causal path without OBOPP is very small. This means that multi-channelled
forceful intervention from the central government mainly occurred in an institutional
environment that favoured protestors. As for protest frames, some protests simultan-
eously use the discourses of COLLECTIVISM and SOCIALISM, which we call “trad-
itional cultural frame” (IF1), while other protestors use the policy-based frame of
RU_VIOLATION and culture-based frames, which we call “mixed frames” (IF2-IF4).
The paths consisting of “mixed frames” explain 34.9 % of cases with multi-channelled
intervention. It should be mentioned that although 65 % of the cases used the “WEAK”
frame, the three “mixed frames” paths do not include “WEAK”, which indicates that
the frame of “WEAK” has limited effect on protest success.
To elaborate the conjectural influence of institutional framework and protest frames on
protest success, we will analyse an anti-demolition case in detail. In this case, a teacher who
was to be relocated as a result of residential demolition was suspended from job without
pay in 2010. From January 25 to 27, 2011, this case was reported by Eastern Morning Post,
Xinhua Daily Telegraph, and People’s Court News. Among these reports, Xinhua Daily
Telegraph pointed out that demolition of “Zhulian”7 style is not only an invasion of citizens’
civil rights but also a violation of laws (Shan 2011). On February 1, 2011, People’s Court
News pointed out that this event was a covert forced demolition, which violated “Regula-
tions on the Expropriation and Compensation of Houses on State-owned Land (draft)”—a
bill that was passed on January 19, 2011; it also contended that such a covert forced demoli-
tion had caused tensions between cadres and those affected by the demolition, which had
further created grievances among the masses (Wang 2011). At the same time, a new district
management committee began investigating this event and later advised that the victim’s
salary should be reinstated, an apology be issued, and self-criticism be conducted about the
demolition. In relation to this case, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission and the
Ministry of Supervision made an announcement in March 2011. The announcement
demanded the strengthening of the supervision of demolition policies, as well as the curbing
and correcting of demolition projects that were in violation of rules and regulations. This
case shows that mass media are more likely to report anti-demolition protests from the per-
spective of the rule of law and their violation following the promulgation of new laws and
regulations. It also confirms that the co-presence of the discourse of socialism such as
cadre-mass relations and legal discourse (Lee 2000; Tong 2006). Similarly, a case in Jiangxi
province clearly demonstrates the effects of protest frames. During an investigation by
China Youth Daily, one staff member confidently bragged that “this kind of news regarding
demolition incidents would never be publicly reported” (Tu 2008). Yet, when Legal Daily
synthesized anti-demolition protestors’ discourse and raised questions about whether the
local government should use political resources to service demolition for business develop-
ment, whether threatening civil servants related to the demolished house units (see
“Zhulian”) has any legal base, and the relationship between housing demolition regulations and
property law, the local government swiftly responded to such questions (Chen and Li 2008).
Understanding factors that shape central government intervention
Why is using a particular set of protest frames within a particular institutional environ-
ment more likely to gain multi-channelled forceful intervention from the central
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government? This sub-section, drawing from existing studies, will discuss the possible
driving forces of central government’s responses to anti-demolition protests from a
macro perspective. Since 2003, “stability maintenance” has become a core issue in the
governance of Chinese society, and this was strengthened between 2005 and 2008 to
form an authoritarian regime where “protest bargaining” became an important way to
absorb popular protests in a non-zero-sum manner (Lee and Zhang 2013). To a certain
degree, maintaining stability has become the foundation by which the central govern-
ment chooses to intervene in popular protests. We suggest that the drivers of the cen-
tral government’s decision to intervene in anti-demolition protests might lie in its
pursuit of multiple and sometimes conflicting policy aims in relation to land use. On
the one hand, it aims to improve the productivity of land use and promote economic
growth without violating the principle of land being owned by the state; on the other
hand, it is necessary to protect arable land and safeguard food security (Lin and Ho
2005). However, in the process of land and urban development, land transfer fees have
become an important source of revenue for local governments. Driven by economic in-
terests, it is not uncommon that local governments violate laws and regulations, which
has not only caused anti-demolition protests and aggravated social conflicts but also in-
fluenced the policy aim of protecting arable land. The pursuit of arable land protection,
social stability maintenance, and disciplining local governments provides drivers that
encourage the central government to intervene.
A study has pointed out that political legitimacy is an important driver of central gov-
ernment intervention (Cai 2010). In the past 10 years, the state has endeavoured to re-
gain political legitimacy, and its focus has shifted from economic performance and
nationalism to political ideology and institution building (Holbig and Gilley 2010), ele-
vating the significance of ideologies such as harmonious society, traditional culture, the
building of institutions to support governance, and democracy with Chinese character-
istics (e.g. rule by law). Against this background, the protest frames of socialism, col-
lectivism, and rule violation are congruent with the political ideologies, traditional
culture, and institution building which undergird the rebuilding of political legitimacy;
this congruency has not only provided protestors the justification for mobilization and
organization (Tong 2006) but also enhanced the legitimacy of their demands. The cen-
tral government’s inaction, in the face of legitimate demands, may negatively influence
its political legitimacy. In line with this, the framing strategies described previously en-
courage intervention from the central government. In addition, political legitimacy
building is also a driver for changing rules and regulations (Gilley 2008). Specifically,
not only are readjustments of demolition policies a response from the central govern-
ment to past protests (Cai 2010) but they can also be regarded as an effort by the cen-
tral government to regain political legitimacy and maintain social stability. Situated in
this political context, using the frame of rule violation is conducive to protest success.
Lastly, using multiple protest frames that are compatible and congruent with the state’s
legitimacy building efforts can appeal to different central government departments and
thus increase the effectiveness of framing strategies.
In sum, the central government’s “multiple-channelled intervention” is key to the suc-
cess of protests in China. Stability maintenance and the multiplicity of policy aims are
the foundation for central intervention. The state’s recent efforts to regain political le-
gitimacy mean that protest frames play a crucial role in promoting central government
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intervention. As demonstrated previously, protestors are more likely to gain “multiple-
channelled forceful intervention” from the central government when they utilize mul-
tiple “mixed frames” congruent with the state’s legitimacy building discourse.
Conclusion and discussion
This article takes anti-demolition protests as a case to explore what factors shape the
success of socially influential protests. It compared 40 cases of anti-demolition protests
that occurred in 2003–2012 through the method of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative
analysis and found that the co-presence of central government direct intervention and
supportive reports from central state-sponsored media is a sufficient condition for pro-
test success. We call this mode of intervention “multi-channelled forceful intervention”.
Although framing strategies have explanatory power for protest success, they are likely
to indirectly influence protest success through increasing the central government’s
“multi-channelled forceful intervention”. It found that the frames of SOCIALISM,
COLLECTIVISM, and RU_VIOLATION are pertinent to protest success. In sum, polit-
ical opportunity structures and framing theories have strong explanatory power for pro-
test success in China.
Although the institutional environment is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condi-
tion for protest success, it does play an important part in shaping the success of pro-
tests: (1) the most successful protests occurred within an institutional framework
favourable to protestors; (2) analysis shows that the co-presence of a favourable institu-
tional framework and a “multi-channelled intervention” from the central government is
required for protest success once it is defined by a stricter criterion; and (3) when insti-
tutional environment is favourable to protestors, framing strategies are more likely to
increase the chance of central government intervention. These findings suggest that an
institutional framework favourable to protesters should be regarded as a political op-
portunity structure. Meanwhile, it should be acknowledged that protestors may per-
ceive and make use of political opportunities differently, and future studies need to
investigate how “objective” political opportunities, protestors’ perception of opportun-
ities, and their strategies to make use of opportunities jointly shape the protest results.
The importance of political opportunities, and central government interventions in
particular, for protest success lends support to existing studies of protests (e.g. Cai
2010). Meanwhile, this study further elaborates the significance of the central govern-
ment’s “multi-channelled intervention”. Specifically, direct intervention from the central
government is merely one element of the causal path to protest success, and it is the
co-presence of central government’s direct intervention and the support from central
state-sponsored media that forms a sufficient condition for protest success. Comparing
the explanatory power of the central government’s direct intervention and that of the
open support from state-sponsored media shows that the two are roughly the same,
with the latters’ sufficiency coverage slightly larger than that of the former. This finding
is understandable. One potential explanation is that even if the central government dir-
ectly intervenes in a protest, in absence of open media reports, it is difficult for protes-
tors and the public to know the actual attitudes of the central government towards the
protests and therefore difficult to effectively make use of the political opportunities
afforded by higher levels of government. In contrast, when the central government
openly supports a protest, protestors are more likely to fully take advantage of the
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political opportunities afforded by the higher-level governments and more likely to gain
support from the public so that protestors have more power to bargain with the local
governments and eventually achieve success. In addition, the co-presence of the central
government’s direct intervention and supportive reports from state-sponsored media
also implies the multiplicity of potential allies from within the polity, which is a key fac-
tor to successful protests. In line with the above discussion, it is possible to develop a
typology to describe different modes of government intervention based on the interven-
tion channels (e.g. single channel vs multiple channels) and whether intervention is
public. And the “multiple-channelled intervention” studied in this paper is a particular
mode of intervention that simultaneously occurs in multiple channels and is known to
the public because of media coverage. Yet, it is worth mentioning that the above theor-
etical explanation needs further investigation.
Our study shows that there is no robust relationship between the occurrence of the cen-
tral government’s “multi-channelled intervention” and resource mobilization, as well as
“multi-channelled intervention” and protest tactics. In contrast, meaningful relationships
between protest frames and the occurrence of “multi-channelled intervention” are identi-
fied. Among the frames, COLLECTIVISM, SOCIALISM, and RU_VIOLATION play sig-
nificant roles in anti-demolition protests, while the WEAK frame is not beneficial to protest
success. We argue that, on the one hand, the authoritarian regime of stability maintenance
and the multiplicity of policy aims in relation to land use is key to understanding the central
government’s multi-channelled forceful intervention in anti-demolition protests; and on the
other hand, the central government’s endeavour to regain political legitimacy to a certain
degree affords political opportunities for successful protests. Protest frames congruent with
the state’s legitimacy building discourse not only legitimize protestors’ claims but also in-
crease the cost of central government inaction. Strategic use of such frames thus is able to
gain supportive intervention from the central government. Our findings suggest that fram-
ing can not only mobilize potential participants by activating the public’s resonance with
the cause at stake (Amenta and Caren 2004) but also influence protest results by directly
appealing to higher level governments and the central government in particular. The tre-
mendous significance of ideology and legitimacy for authoritarian states make the latter
working mechanism of framing strategies especially important. Of course, why governments
are more likely to respond to particular frames needs further study.
Some may argue that because the selected cases span across 10 years, media reports
about protests occurring at an early stage can influence the frames used in protests
during later stages and thus indirectly shape the likelihood of success. If this argument
holds, it implies systematic differences in frame prevalence between early and later
stages. To test this inference, we used 2008 to demarcate our cases into two periodic
groups and investigated whether there was a significant difference in the usage of pro-
test frames. Analysis shows no systematic differences; hence, the previously mentioned
argument is not supported. Moreover, is it possible that the occurrence and results of
protests at the early stage influence the dynamics and results of protests at the latter
stage? We think that such feedback effects do exist, with the most important being that
the central government may adjust the rules and policies regarding demolition as a re-
sult of early anti-demolition protests; further, such adjustments may provide opportun-
ities for protests at later stages. It is worth mentioning that such a feedback effect does
not invalidate the conclusions of this study.
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This article has some limitations. First, using media reports as data sources might
lead to selection bias. It has been demonstrated that media coverage of popular protests
is shaped by factors such as event type, issue involved, news agency, event size, and sta-
tus of event sponsors (Earl et al. 2004; McCarthy et al. 2008). Given that the selected
cases in this study are by and large socially influential ones, the findings of the present
study are mainly generalized to high-profile and influential protests, and whether they
can be generalized to more localized protests will require further investigation. Second,
due to the limit of data availability, this article has not yet examined the roles of institu-
tional protest tactics (e.g. litigation and petition writing) and news reports from local
media. Finally, this study aims to explore what factors are conducive to successful pro-
tests by systematically comparing cases, which means that it has not scrutinized the dy-
namic mechanisms through which these factors lead to the success of protests by in-
depth analysis of individual cases. Future studies can use in-depth interviews to explore
how strategic interactions between protestors and governments shape protest out-
comes. Specifically, probing how protestors and local governments perceive signals
from the central government and act accordingly can further substantiate the thesis of
“multi-channelled forceful intervention” in the present study.
Endnotes
1For discussion on the conceptual difference between protest outcome and protest
consequence, see Amenta and Caren 2004, Cress and Snow 2000, and Giugni 1998.
2http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001048280/ accessed on April 27, 2014.
3If the consistency index is significantly lower than 0.8, then the coverage index has
no practical meaning and there is no need to calculate it.
4In a six-value coding scheme, fuzzy-set scores can take values of 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.3,
and 0. Among these values, 1 represents the presence of a condition, 0 represents the
absence of a condition, and other values are in-between.
5“OBOPP” means objective opportunity.
6Roughly speaking, raw coverage measures the percentage of cases a particular path
can explain. Yet some cases can be explained by multiple causal paths; thus, raw cover-
age cannot effectively reflect the explanatory power of one causal path after considering
the other causal paths. Unlike raw coverage, unique coverage measures the percentage
of cases that can only be explained by a particular causal path.
7ZhuLian refers to the way property developers and local governments threaten to
terminate the employment of public officials found among anti-demolition protestors
and/or those public officials who happen to be related to anti-demolition protestors—-
not only by asking them to sign a number of unreasonable relocation agreements, but
also asking them to mobilize their relatives to sign a relocation agreement, or else they
will be suspended without pay or transferred.
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